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IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION: QUALITY v. QUANTITY A DILEMMA IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charia v. CigaretteRacing Team, Inc., 583 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1978).
Plaintiff, a Louisiana resident, filed an action' to rescind 2 the sale of an
allegedly defective boat purchased from defendant Florida manufacturer. 3 The
asserted jurisdictional basis was the Louisiana long-arm statute, 4 which provides
for jurisdiction over nonresidents "transacting any business" or "contracting to
supply services or things" in the state.5 The defendant was alleged to have
satisfied the statute by advertising in national magazines circulated in Louisiana,' selling boats to three other Louisiana residents prior to plaintiff's purchase,7 arranging for shipment s of plaintiff's boat to Louisiana F.O.B. Miami, 9
conducting preliminary negotiations with defendant from Louisiana, 10 and
making all payments to defendant by checks drawn on Louisiana banks.11
1. Plaintiff filed identical actions in state and federal court; the defendant removed and
consolidated the state action with the federal cause. 583 F.2d 184, 187 n.3 (5th Cir. 1978).
2. The plaintiff's action was in redhibition which, under Louisiana law, is defined as "the
avoidance of a sale on account of some vice or defect in the thing sold, which renders it
either absolutely useless, or its use so inconvenient and imperfect, that it must be supposed
that the buyer would not have purchased it, had he known of the vice." LA. CIV. CODE ANN.
art. 2520 (West 1952).
3. Plaintiff also asserted a tort claim for injury caused by a defective boat seat, but the
claim was rejected by the court as unspecific. It was apparently not the main "thrust" of the
plaintiff's case. 583 F.2d at 188.
4. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §13:3201 (West 1968 & West Supp. 1979): "A court may exercise
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of
action arising from the nonresident's: (a) transacting any business in this state; (b) contracting
to supply services or things in this state; (c) causing injury or damage by an offense or quasi
offense committed through an act or omission in this state; (d) causing injury or damage in
this state by an offense or quasi offense committed through an act or omission outside of this
state if he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of
conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in
this state; (e) having an interest in, using or possessing a real right or immovable property in
this state; or (f) non-support of a child or spouse or a former spouse domiciled in this state
to whom an obligation of support is owed and with whom the nonresident formerly resided
in this state."
5.

Id.

6. Defendant advertised its product in MOTOR BOATING AND SAILING, MOTOR
BOATING, MOTOR BOATING EQUIPMENT DIRECTORY, SOUTHERN BOATING,
POWERBOAT, BOATING, GONDOLIER, GO BOATING and SOUNDINGS. Brief for
Appellant at 6, Charia v. Cigarette Racing Team, Inc., 583 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1978).
7. Defendant's three prior sales, which totaled $85,000, occurred between 1971 and 1975.
583 F.2d at 189.
8. The cost of shipping was included in the cost of the boat. Id. at 186.
9. F.O.B. (free on board) means that the seller or consigner of goods will deliver them to
the car, vessel, or other conveyance on which they are to be transported, without expense to
the buyer or consignee. The term may or may not indicate the technical fact of delivery,
depending upon the construction of the phrase. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 703 (4th ed. 1968).
10.

583 F.2d at 186.

11. Id. Plaintiff made a downpayment of $3000 and upon completion tendered the remaining $27,000. No formal written agreement was ever entered into by the parties. The purpose
of plaintiff's first trip was to tender downpayment. The purpose of the two subsequent trips
was to ascertain the boat's fitness upon completion.
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Finding these contacts insufficient, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana dismissed the cause of action for lack of in
personam jurisdiction. 12 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit affirmed and HELD: defendant had not purposely availed itself of
Louisiana as a forum,'3 and because defendant's ties with that state were
isolated and sporadic, 14 the exercise of in personam jurisdiction would offend
due process under the fourteenth amendment.15
In the 1877 landmark case of Pennoyer v. Neff,' 6 the United States Supreme
Court held that due process of law required the limitation of in personam
jurisdiction to individuals physically present in the state at the time process was
served. 7 During the first half of the twentieth century, as the growth of modern
transportation, communication, and interstate commerce increasingly placed
defendants beyond the reach of process, the Supreme Court began to move away
from the theory of territorial power articulated in Pennoyer.'s The search for
12. Id. at 184.
13. Id. at 189.
14. Id.
15. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, §1.

16. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
17. Id. at 727. Pennoyer's importance lies in the application of the fifth amendment right
of due process to state jurisdictions through the newly adopted fourteenth amendment. See
Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of
State Courts: From Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 569, 572 (1958).
18. Kurland, supra note 17, at 573. Jurisdiction over natural persons during this era expanded as courts yielded to more liberal interpretations of "consent" and "presence:' For
example, in Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927), the Court upheld a nonresident motorist
statute which subjected nonresidents to jurisdiction by substitute service on the secretary of
state. The defendant was deemed to have impliedly consented to jurisdiction by operating a
dangerous instrumentality, an automobile, on Massachusetts highways. In Milliken v. Meyer,
311 U.S. 457 (1940), jurisdiction was upheld on a theory of implied consent over a Wyoming
resident who was served with Wyoming process regarding a Wyoming suit while in Colorado.
The Court noted that "the state which accords privileges and affords protection to him and
his property by virtue of his domicile may also exact reciprocal duties." Id. at 463. See also
York v. Texas, 137 U.S. 15 (1890) (nonresident defendant was held to be present and to have
consented to jurisdiction in Texas even though his appearance before the court was limited
solely to contesting jurisdiction).
In personam jurisdiction over nonresident corporations developed somewhat differently
than jurisdiction over real persons. Originally, corporate entities were considered to have no
existence beyond the state of their incorporation. See Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13
Pet.) 519, 588 (1839). This notion was dispelled by later decisions which reasoned that by
conducting business within a state, a corporation had impliedly consented to service of
process on a public official of the forum. See, e.g., Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18
How.) 404 (1855). Another theory for exercising jurisdiction over corporations focused on the
nature of the business rather than on a theory of implied consent. Several states enacted legislation for regulation of exceptional business activities likely to cause harm to the public,
providing for jurisdiction and service of process in the statute. Jurisdiction under this type of
statute was viewed by the courts as a valid exercise of state police power. E.g., Henry L.
Doherty & Co. v. Goodwin, 294 U.S. 623 (1935) (state's desire to regulate the sale of securities
considered adequate to support jurisdiction over a nonresident).
Another theory consonant with the territorial concept was that of "presence:' A corporation, by carrying on business activities within a state, was deemed present in a state and
amenable to jurisdiction through substituted service. See, e.g., Barrow Steamship Co. v. Kane,
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a more workable jurisdictional standard culminated in 1945 with International
Shoe Co. v. Washington,19 in which the Court proclaimed that in personam
jurisdiction could be obtained over an absent defendant if he had "minimum
contacts" with the forum such that maintenance of jurisdiction would not
offend notions of "fair play" and "substantial justice." 20
The quest to define the outer limits of due process under this new qualitative test of fairness reached fruition in McGee v. InternationalLife Insurance
Co. 21 The McGee Court found that a nonresident insurance company which
had mailed a single reinsurance contract into the forum was amenable to in
personam jurisdiction22 because the contract constituted a "substantial connec170 U.S. 100 (1898). The "doing business" concept of corporate jurisdiction which finally
evolved was a combination of the presence and consent theories. The term was attributed
several different constructions, as evidenced by its varied applications. See Kurland, supra note
17, at 584-86.
For excellent accounts of the historical aspects of in personam jurisdiction, see generally
Hoffman, The Plastic Frontiers of State Judicial Power Over Nonresidents: McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 24 BROOKLYN L. REv. 291 (1958); Kurland, supra note 17; Seidelson, Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Defendants: Beyond "Minimum Contacts" and the LongArm Statutes, 6 DuQ. L. REv. 221 (1968).
19. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
20. "[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in
personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum
contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice." Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463
(1940)).
The Court stated that a single act was not an improbable basis for jurisdiction. The
Court felt that determination of in personam jurisdiction should not be based on mechanical
or quantitative evaluation but should be predicated on the weighing of the quality and
nature of the activity "in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it
was the purpose of the due process clause to insure." Id. at 318-19.
Some commentators viewed InternationalShoe as a partial death knell to the principles of
Pennoyer. See, e.g., Ehrenzweig, Pennoyer is Dead- Long Live Pennoyer, 30 RocKY MTN. L.
Rxv. 285 (1958).
21. 355 U.s. 220 (1957). Up until McGee, the Court had rendered some decisions which
tended to further define the InternationalShoe standard but did not attempt to set any ultimate limits to due process. See, e.g., Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437
(1952), in which the Court found that it was at each state's discretion whether a nexus must
exist between the activities within the forum and the injury complained of for purposes of in
personam jurisdiction; Traveler's Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950), in which the
solicitation activities of unpaid insurance association members were held sufficient contacts on
which to base jurisdiction.
22. The insurance policy had been purchased by the insured in 1945. In 1949, the original
insurer sought to divest itself of policies in California whereupon the defendant, a Texas based
firm, offered by mail to assume the policy. The insured accepted the offer and a new policy
was mailed to him in California. Thereafter, he mailed premiums from California on a
monthly basis. International Life had no agents in California; its only connection to the state
was the solitary policy involved in this case. The insured, Franklin, died in 1950. When his
mother attempted to collect on the policy, the company denied the claim on the premise that
he had committed suicide. The mother obtained jurisdiction over International Life in
California under the Unauthorized Insurers Act and won a judgment. When she sought to
enforce the judgment in Texas, the Texas court refused to give it full faith and credit.
Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, upheld the California judgment, finding the single contract sufficient to sustain jurisdiction. McGee v.
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tion"23 with the forum state.24 Expansive exercise of jurisdiction based on
McGee was limited, however, by the requirements subsequently imposed by
Hanson v. Denckla25 that a contact must be purposive before it can serve as a
basis for jurisdiction.26 In Hanson, the Supreme Court ruled that a Florida
probate court could not assert jurisdiction over a Delaware trust 27 because the
nonresident trustee had not purposely availed himself of the protection of the
forum state's laws. 28 The Court reasoned that to subject the trustee to suit on
International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. at 220-24. In essence, the McGee decision reinforced the
"single act" language of InternationalShoe. See note 20 supra.
23. 355 U.S. at 223.
24. McGee has been characterized by some writers as establishing the outer limits of due
process. See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 18, at 304; Shepherd, How Long Is the Long Arm of
Due Process, 34 INs. CoUtsL J. 297, 297 (1967); Note, PersonalJurisdictionin Minnesota over
Absent Defendant, 42 MINN. L. REv. 909, 922 (1958); Comment, Long-Arm and Quasi In
Rem Jurisdictionand the Fundamental Test of Fairness,69 MIcH.L. REv. 300, 306 (1970).
Other commentators indicate that McGee may have been merely a valid exercise of the
state regulatory function in the tradition of Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927). See, e.g.,
Ehrenzweig, supra note 20, at 291; Seidelson, supra note 18, at 221; von Mehren & Trautman,
Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HAv. L. Ray. 1121, 1150-51 (1966).
25. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
26. Whether this case was intended as a limitation of McGee has been generally open to
speculation. See Carrington & Martin, Substantive Interests and the Jurisdiction of State
Courts, 66 MicH. L. Rxv. 227, 235 (1967) (suggesting that the decision showed the reluctance
of the Court to intervene in the administration of trusts and estates); Foster, JudicialEconomy,
Fairness and Convenience of Place of Trial: Long-Arm Jurisdiction in District Courts, 47
F.R.D. 73, 92 (1968) (commenting that in the decade since Hanson, the Court has not followed the implications of that case and that the Hanson opinion has in no way restricted
long-arm developments to activities subject to special state regulation; the author further
suggests that the Court may have had difficulty in distinguishing McGee; Kurland, supra note
17, at 622 (suggesting that the case will be viewed by the Court as either a permanent or
temporary precedent in a move toward nationwide in personam jurisdiction; Seidelson, supra
note 18, at 230 (stating that the most reliable assertion in the case was that further relaxation
of restrictions on in personam jurisdiction is certain); Shepherd, supra note 24, at 298 (viewing Hanson as a statement that due process demands territorial limitations on judicial power);
von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 24, at 1174 (characterizing the case as one in which,
between states with equal interest in the outcome, the Court chose the forum which offered
guarantees against an aberrational or unfair choice-of-law process); Comment, supra note 24,
at 308 (commenting that in light of subsequent decision, Hanson may have required only
that the defendant perform some purposeful act which affected the state rather than requiring
a voluntary and knowing association with the state).
27. In Hanson, the testator had been domiciled in Pennsylvania at the time she established an inter vivos trust in Delaware. Subsequent to creating the trust, she changed her
domicile to Florida, after which she conducted mutual communications with the trustee and
received income from the trust. Upon her death, her will was probated in Florida. The Florida
court found the Delaware trust agreement invalid because the settlor retained too much control. Additionally, the court ruled that because the document had an insufficient number of
witnesses, it could not be attached to the will as a testamentary document. Due to this
defect, the trust would have passed to the residual legatees rather than the settlor's grandchildren as provided in the trust agreement. However, Florida law required that jurisdiction
be obtained over the trustee in order for control to be gained over the trust. The Court found
that although the trustee had had contact with the forum, such contact was merely a fortuitous
result of the settlor's change in domicile and was, not the result of purposeful activity within
the forum. 357 U,S. at 288-43, 252.
28. Id. at 253.
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the basis of the unilateral acts of another, the settlor, would constitute a
violation of due process.29 More importantly, the Court stated that recent expansion of in personam jurisdiction did not signal the demise of territorial
sovereignty. 30 Although this restrictive language was reminiscent of the Pennoyer decision, Hanson, like McGee, constituted an elaboration upon what was
essentially a qualitative test of fairness. The two cases defined the parameters
for jurisdictional assertions within the International Shoe test of substantial
justice.
The potential impact of InternationalShoe, McGee, and Hanson was not
immediately realized in the Fifth Circuit. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit paid lip service to the expansion of in personam jurisdiction. Nevertheless, because of outdated state jurisdictional statutes,31 the court
continued to emphasize the physical presence standard.32 With the advent of
extensive "long-arm" 33 legislation in most states within the circuit, the court
began to cautiously test the limits of due process in several substantive areas.29. Id.
30. Id. at 251.
31. The reason for lack of immediate impact may have been that, although rule 4(d)(7)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows federal courts to employ the jurisdictional devices of the states in which they preside, most states in the Fifth Circuit had not drafted
statutes which took advantage of the increased breadth of in personam jurisdiction provided
by InternationalShoe. The court was forced to deal with outmoded service of process statutes
keyed to the old concept of doing business. See, e.g., Stanga v. McCormick Shipping Corp. 268
F.2d 544, 548 (5th Cir. 1959) (citing LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §13:3471(5)(a)-(d) (West 1954), a
statute originally enacted for the purpose of reaching the limits of due process, but requiring
the presence of agents and employees "in" the state); Acme Engineers v. Foster Eng'r Co., 254
F.2d 259, 261-63 (5th Cir. 1958) (citing TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2031 (Vernon 1919) (a
service of process statute which did away with the requirement of doing business while still
requiring service of process on an individual "in this state').
32. See, e.g., Roumel v. Drill Well Oil Co., 270 F.2d 550, 555-58 (5th Cir. 1959) (physical
presence required for in personam jurisdiction and McGee acknowledged but its importance
dismissed in favor of Pennoyer).
33. Long-arm statutes are statutes which allow local forums to obtain jurisdiction over
nonresident defendants when the cause of action is generated locally and affects local plaintiffs.
S. GiFns, LAW DICTIONARY 122 (1975).
34. Space will not permit thorough treatment of all substantive areas; however, a limited
treatment of the development of in personam jurisdiction in tort litigation is necessary for an
understanding of the concept of jurisdiction in relation to contracts.
In the area of products liability for items manufactured outside the forum, the Fifth Circuit
during the early and middle 19 60's required both contacts within the forum and an injury in
order to sustain jurisdiction. E.g., Phillips v. Hooker Chem. Corp., 375 F.2d 189, 193 (5th Cir.
1967) (in which the court found that continuous and systematic solicitation and sale of chemicals plus injury by the chemicals was sufficient to bring the case within both due process and
the Florida long-arm statute). By 1969, in a break from the prior standard, the court gave
tentative approval to the "stream of commerce" theory, but did not define the level of activity necessary for invocation of the concept. Under this theory, first articulated by the
Illinois Supreme Court in Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 III. 2d
432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961), a manufacturer who anticipates national consumption of his
product but does not directly distribute that product may be subject to jurisdiction in a
state to which his product is ultimately shipped. For example, in Eyerly Aircraft Co. v.
Killian, 414 F.2d 591, 597 (5th Cir. 1969), a nonresident manufacturer of amusement rides
who had sold his products with knowledge that they would move from state to state was held
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In the area of contract law, long-arm statutes which allowed jurisdiction on
the basis of a single contract were viewed conservatively during the early
1960's. 3s The Fifth Circuit tended to ignore the "substantial connection" lan6 and instead stressed the limiting effect of Hanson.3 7 Other
guage of McGeeM
contacts with the forum, usually in the form of physical activity within the
state,3 s were required in addition to the contractual relationship. During the
early 1970's, however, the court appeared to relax the quantitative and mechanical "contract-plus-other-contacts" rules, indicating at least a partial acceptance
of the qualitative substantial connection test of McGee. 9 Additionally, the
court began to apply the "stream of commerce" theory, which predicates jurisdiction upon the manufacturer's expectation that his product will reach the
forum state.40 Despite this decidedly more liberal trend, the court has refused
amenable to jurisdiction in Texas. However, in Eyerly, because the defendant company had
other extensive contacts within Texas, the scope of this more liberal standard was left undetermined. The standard which finally emerged in later cases allowed jurisdiction on the sole
basis of injury by goods shipped into the state if such shipments were forseeable and substantial. Coulter v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 426 F.2d 1315, 1318 (5th Cir. 1970) (shipment of a
large number of televisions into Texas through an independent distributor established adequate grounds for jurisdiction). See also Jetco Elec. Indus., Inc. v. Gardiner, 473 F.2d 1228 (5th
Cir. 1973) (libelous product evaluation test placed in the stream of commerce by a nonresident proved to be sufficient grounds for jurisdiction when considered in light of additional
unrelated and insignificant contacts with the forum).
35. See, e.g., Lone Star Motor Import, Inc. v. Citroen Cars Corp., 288 F.2d 69, 74 (5th
Cir. 1961), in which the court refused to test the constitutionality of TEX. CIV. STAT. art.
2031(b)(4) (Vernon Supp. 1960), which states in part that "any foreign corporation ... shall
be deemed doing business in this State by entering into contract by mail or otherwise with a
resident of Texas to be performed in whole or in part by either party in this State...."
(quoting Lone Star Motor Import, Inc. v. Citroen Cars Corp., 288 F.2d 69, 72 n.2 (5th Cir.

1961)). Noting that other contacts existed with the forum in addition to the contract, the court
remanded with leave for plaintiff to amend and allege additional contacts.
36. See, e.g., Atwood Hatcheries v. Heisdorf & Nelson Farms, 357 F.2d 847, 853-54 (5th
Cir. 1966).
37. Id.
38. Id. (where supervisory personnel traveling within the state plus the shipment of
chickens into the state was held to be sufficient additional contact).
39. See Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483, 495-96 (5th Cir. 1974). In
Cousteau, the plaintiff, a Texan, traveled to France, where he negotiated with the defendant
to test and take underwater movies of a fish-attracting device. The defendant, a French firm,
agreed to do the work and mailed a contract to Texas which plaintiff signed and returned.
Subsequently, defendant mailed two reels of film into the state which, along with the contract, were held sufficient contacts to allow jurisdiction. The court found that the locus of the
contract was in Texas and, relying on McGee, ruled that association by mail was sufficient
contact with the forum. No physical act within the forum was required. Citing Hanson, the
court further found that the defendant had availed himself of the forum as a result of the
affirmative and purposeful decision to conduct business in Texas. The court dimissed the fact
that the contractual relationship was unilaterally initiated by the plaintiff, finding that defendant's actions thereafter were deliberate and not fortuitous. Finally, the court stressed that
requiring defense of the suit in Texas did not rise to the level of a denial of due process.
40. See Jetco Elec. Indus. v. Gardiner, 473 F.2d 1228, 1234 (5th Cir. 1973) (defendant,
who had written a libelous report regarding plaintiff's product, submitted the report to a
customer who published the report in nationally circulated periodicals distributed in Texas.
Plaintiff's damage was purely financial, but the court found the stream of commerce theory
acceptable). For further discussion of stream of commerce, see note 34 supra.
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to relinquish altogether the contract-plus-other-contacts 41 language, and occasionally has applied this mechanical test to restrict jurisdiction.4 2 In Benjamin v. Western Boat Building Co.,43 the plaintiff, a Louisiana resident

temporarily domiciled in North Carolina, contracted by mail with a Washington boat builder to construct a yacht. Plaintiff personally took delivery of the
boat in Washington and arranged for shipment to Louisiana.4 4 Employing a
contracts-plus-other-contacts test, the Benjamin court dismissed McGee's substantial connection guidelines45 and relied principally on Hanson's reference
to unilateral activity to evaluate the contacts of the defendant in Louisiana.
The court noted that the plaintiff had initiated the greater part of the communications between the parties.48 Additionally, the court dismissed the stream
of commerce theory 47 and found advertising in national magazines inadequate
48
to qualify as a contact for purposes of jurisdictional analysis.
49
In the instant case the Fifth Circuit relied heavily on the contract-plusother-contacts theory as a basis for its decision.50 While the court purported to
adhere to the principles of InternationalShoe, McGee, and Hanson as control41. Hereinafter referred to as the "contract-plus" test.
42. See, e.g., Benjamin v. Western Boat Bldg. Corp., 472 F.2d 723 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 830 (1973).
43. 472 F.2d 723 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 830 (1973). Benjamin, while temporarily
domiciled in North Carolina, contracted with a Virginia-domiciled naval architect to draw
plans for a yacht. Upon completion of the plans, the architect placed the yacht's construction
up for bids. Western Boat, a Washington company, was invited to bid and won the contract.
Benjamin signed a contract mailed to him in North Carolina by Western Boat and returned
the agreement to Washington. The contract provided for construction, inspections, and delivery to take place in Tacoma. During the construction period, Benjamin returned to
Louisiana and while there apparently initiated and received several communications both by
mail and phone. Upon completion, Benjamin personally took delivery of the boat at defendant's plant in Washington, sailed it to San Francisco, and shipped it from there to
Louisiana. The boat thereafter received a good deal of national recognition in boating
periodicals. The cause of action arose ten years after delivery and was based on warranty,
with Benjamin asserting the existence of severe defects in material and workmanship. Id. at
728.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 730. The court evidently took the view that McGee represented a state's valid
exercise of police power in regulating an exceptional activity. The court stated that "McGee
involved a transaction with a nonresident insurance company and the sensitive nature of the
insurance business lent additional weight to the Court's measure of the insurance company's
contacts with the forum state." Id.
46. Id. at 730-31.
47. Id. at 726-27, 730. Citing Coulter v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 462 F.2d 1315 (5th Cir. 1970),
the Benjamin court determined that knowledge that a product could eventually be expected
to arrive in a forum was insufficient for jurisdictional purposes in the absence of substantial
volume or other contacts within the forum. Therefore, the fact that Western knew the boat
would be registered in Louisiana was not a weighty contact. See note 34 supra.
48. Benjamin v. Western Boat Bldg. Corp., 472 F.2d at 729. Relying on Buckley v. New
York Times Co., 338 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1964), the court found that circulation within the
forum of periodicals containing advertising or articles regarding the defendant did not constitute doing business in Louisiana. 472 F.2d at 726-27.
49. 583 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1978).
50. Id. at 186. The court stated that "some interconnection" between the defendant and
the forum is necessary.
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ling the limits of in personam jurisdiction,5' the actual basis for the court's
opinion was Benjamin.52 Referring to an eleven point checklist of contacts
used in Benjamin, the court found the instant case to be both factually and
substantively comparable. 5 3 Only three contentions were found in plaintiff's
argument which pointed to potentially important distinctions between the two
cases: 54 a subsidiary tort claim based on physical injury, 55 an assertion that
shipment of the boat into Louisiana constituted purposeful contact with the
forum56 and a claim that additional sales within Louisiana reflected a purposeful, continuous, and systematic relationship with the state.57
With respect to the tort claim, the instant court ruled that the cause was
unspecific and of little importance to the plaintiff's contract action.55 In reviewing the allegation that shipment of the boat into Louisiana came under
the stream of commerce theory, the court asserted that "F.O.B. Miami" indicated that title and risk of loss passed to the plaintiff in Miami under Florida
law.5 9 Thus, the defendant had not intentionally availed itself of the benefits
of Louisiana law. Finally, the court rejected the claim that three additional
51. Id. The court chose to move straight to the constitutional question because it found
no Louisiana precedent which interpreted the appropriate sections of the Louisiana long-arm
statute. Id. at 185.
52. The instant court felt that Benjamin "closely parallelled" the instant case and was
therefore controlling precedent. Id. at 187.
53. Id. at 184. The eleven contact points included the fact that Western Boat: "(1) is a
corporation organized under the laws of Washington; (2) is not qualified to do business in
Louisiana; (3) has neither incurred nor paid taxes to Louisiana; (4) has not appointed an
agent for service of process in Louisiana; (5) has no office, no place of business, no officers, no
agents, no employees, no salesmen, no licensees, no franchisees, and no distributors in Louisiana; (6) has no independent dealers in Louisiana; (7) has no assets in Louisiana; (8) has never
advertised in local Louisiana media and is not listed in any Louisiana telephone directories;
(9) has never delivered or arranged to be delivered, a vessel of any kind in Louisiana; (10) has
never made a sale to a resident of Louisiana, other than the sale to Benjamin; and (11) has
never sent representatives, inspectors, or repair or service personnel to Louisiana." Id. at 187.
54. The court found no difference with Benjamin regarding preliminary negotiations,
advertising within the forum, and post-contractual communications. Id. at 187-88. Likewise,
the court found no merit in the fact that the checks offered in payment were drawn on
Louisiana banks. Id. The court, unlike Benjamin, did find that the place of contracting was
possibly fortuitous (relying on Vencedor Mfg. Co. v. Gouglar Indus., Inc., 557 F.2d 886 (1st
Cir. 1977), stating that the place where the parties met face-to-face was more important). 583
F.2d at 188.
55. Id.

56. Id. at 188-89.
57. Id. at 189.
58. Id. at 188. Apparently, plaintiff's counsel also considered the tort claim to be somewhat
weak and in reality not a central theme in the case. The court mentioned that regardless of
the tort claim's veracity, it would not help the plaintiff to gain jurisdiction over the contract
claim. Id.
59. Id. at 188-89. The court cited to FLA. STAT. §672.319(1) (1967), which states that "the
term 'F.O.B.' at a named place, even though used only in connection with the stated price, is
a deliveiy term."
Additionally, the court relied on two district court decisions which found F.O.B. deliveries
outside the forum to be an insufficient basis for jurisdiction. See R. Clinton Constr. Co. v.
Bryant &Reaves, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 838 (N.D. Miss. 1977); Harris v. North Am. Rockwell Corp.,
372 F. Supp. 958 (N.D. Ga. 1974).
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sales by the defendant in Louisiana constituted an important jurisdictional
nexus, characterizing those sales as isolated, sporadic, and lacking purposeful
contact. 60
Considering the relatively conservative slant of Fifth Circuit decisions regarding in personam jurisdiction,61 the instant case might have been less
anomalous had the court not attempted to make the case fit the facts of
Benjamin.62 The manipulation of forum contacts in that decision was symptomatic of a quantitative measurement of jurisdiction. 63 The instant court used
a similar mechanical standard of evaluation by emphasizing physical contact
with the forum 64 and relying on a quantitative tabulation of contacts without
reference to their quality. 65 For example, the court failed to consider the defendant's expectations regarding the possibility of litigating in a Louisiana
forum.66 Little credence was placed upon the defendant's knowledge that it was
dealing with a Louisiana resident 67 and that the boat would be registered and
docked in Louisiana.6s Moreover, the court neither made an assessment of the
relative inconveniences to the parties presented by jurisdiction in Louisiana, 69
nor commented on Louisiana's interest in providing a forum for its citizens.70
60. 583 F.2d at 189. Citing to Coulter v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 426 F.2d 1315 (5th Cir.
1970), the court found three additional sales of $85,000 to Louisiana residents insufficient to
meet the test of large quantities shipped into the state over a substantial period of time.
In evaluating defendant's additional sales, the court also mentioned that there was "no
evidence that any employee of Cigarette was ever present in Louisiana." 583 F.2d at 189.
Language of a similar nature was used regarding the importance of F.O.B. shipment. Id at 188.
61. See text accompanying notes 31-49 supra.
62. 583 F.2d at 187. The decision in Benjamin was probably correct; however, that a
similar result should have been reached in the instant case on the basis of factual similarity is
symptomatic of a superficial approach. The two cases are readily distinguishable upon qualitative assessment of the contacts.
63. For an illustration of the approach adopted in Benjamin, see notes 45, 47-48 & 54 supra.
64. 583 F.2d at 186-89. For further discussion of the different theoretical jurisdictional
tests, see Comment, supra note 24, at 311-16.
65. 583 F.2d at 186-89. As was noted in the appellant's brief, the only true similarity
between Benjamin and the instant case was that both concerned the purchase of a boat.
Brief for Appellant at 12, Charia v. Cigarette Racing Team, Inc., 583 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1978).
66. For discussion of the expectation concept, see generally Currie, The Growth of the
Long-Arm; Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 533, 549-60
(1963); Comment, supra note 24, at 322.
67. The court was not concerned with the fact that the plaintiff was a long-time citizen of
Louisiana. But cf. Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483, 497 n.26 (5th Cir.
1974) (distinguishing Benjamin on the grounds that the plaintiff in that case was nomadic;
thus, there was little expectation in that case of a specific forum for potential litigation).
68. 583 F.2d at 188-89. Important to the court was that under F.O.B. shipment, title and
risk of loss passed to the plaintiff in Florida as if he had taken delivery personally. This type
of analysis begs the question; an expectation of forum can be created without actual physical
contact. See Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483, 496 (5th Cir. 1974) (contact
by mail found sufficient for jurisdiction); Thorington v. Cash, 494 F.2d 582, 587 (5th Cir.
1974) (fraudulent representations mailed into the forum found sufficient to sustain jurisdiction).
69. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 224 (1957) for discussion on this
point.
70. Id. at 223. In Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1974), the
court reached both issues of convenience to the parties and the forum's interest in providing
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The court's reliance on Benjamin rendered these qualitative evaluations of the

defendant's contacts with Louisiana unnecessary, since under that case a finding

1
of insufficient contacts negated the need for evaluation.7
With regard to the contractual relationship between the litigants, the instant court correctly recognized that the often fortuitous nature of the place of
2
contracting makes it an unreliable indicator of forum7 Instead, the court
73
emphasized the location chosen by the parties for face-to-face negotiations.
This emphasis seemingly resurrected Pennoyer's territorial theory of jurisdiction.7' As to the actual face-to-face negotiations, the court failed to examine the
75
relative bargaining positions of the parties.
The court also did not scrutinize the nature of the defendant's business in
assessing jurisdictional connections." The fact that the defendant sold
5
standardized boats77 which were advertised with the presumed intention of

a convenient place of trial for its resident. The Cousteau court, citing McGee, found that because the litigation involved a Texas resident and a nexus existed between the transaction and
the state, Texas had a valid state interest in assuming jurisdiction over the case. 495 F.2d at
496. Regarding inconvenience to the parties, the Cousteau court found that measuring inconvenience to the parties in litigating in one forum or another led to a standoff, but that it was
not unfair to require the defendant, a resident of France, to litigate in Texas. Id. at 498. The
Cousteau analysis presents a compelling argument against the position taken by the defendant
in the instant case, as it is considerably more inconvenient for a French firm to travel to
Texas than for a Florida firm to travel to Louisiana.
71. 472 F.2d at 731. The Benjamin court disposed of the case totally on the grounds of
inadequate contact, thus negating the need to approach the questions of fairness and state
interest. Id.
72. 583 F.2d at 188. This finding by the court is based on Vencedor Mfg. Co. v. Gouglar
Indus., Inc., 557 F.2d 886, 890 (Ist Cir. 1977) and is consistent with McGee. If the McGee court
had chosen to focus on the place of the contract, it would have been possible to find the locus
of the contract in Texas. See text accompanying notes 21-26 supra.
73. 583 F.2d at 188.
74. The court totally disregarded McGee's requirement that the contract need only have
a substantial relationship with the forum. See text accompanying notes 21-24 supra. Instead,
the court utilized a test which placed emphasis upon the locale where both parties were
physically present. 583 F.2d at 188.
75. No mention was made of the fact that the transaction was one between a consumer
and a corporate entity and hence that there was relative inequality in bargaining positions.
See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 24, at 1167-76 (discussing the relative bargaining
position of parties as it affects in personam jurisdiction).
76. The general tone of the opinion created the presumption that the defendant in the
instant case was coequal with the defendant in Benjamin; however, differences do exist. The
defendant in Benjamin produced custom boats built to individual specifications. The company
obtained work by bid and necessarily maintained a local profile as modifications and inspections during construction required the presence of the contracting party. Benjamin v. Western
Boat Bldg. Corp., 472 F.2d at 728. For a discussion of equities involved in subjecting a local as
opposed to a national manufacturer to jurisdiction, see Currie, supra note 66, at 549-60.
77. The defendant's ads in national magazines concentrated on the finished product. Apparently the boats were constructed with specific hull sizes and utilized specific engines with
only certain options remaining for the buyer's discretion. In this regard, ordering one of the
boats was little different from ordering an automobile with options of the buyer's choice. See
Brief for Appellant at 12, Charia v. Cigarette Racing Team, Inc., 583 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1978).
78. The court discounted advertising in national magazines as a valid contact in reliance
on Buckley v. New York Times Co., 338 F.2d 470, 474 (5th Cir. 1964). See note 48 supra. The
court did not, however, take note of the fact that Buckley relied on two cases, one of which
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capturing a national market was left unconsidered.78 Furthermore, the court
did not recognize that shipping was included in the price of a boat80 or that the
defendant usually arranged for shipment of its boats. 81 Such perfunctory evaluation raises the possibility that a manufacturer with limited contacts within a
forum might avoid in personam jurisdiction solely on the basis of shipment
82
practices.
In ruling that the defendant's contacts within Louisiana did not constitute
purposeful activity under the test announced in Hanson,83 the court retreated
from Product Promotions,Inc. v. Cousteau,8 4 which espoused a decidedly more
liberal construction of the Hansbn standard. The decision in the instant case
requires that the defendant actually conduct an activity within the forum,85
unlike Cousteau's requirement that the defendant carry on activities bearing
some purposive relation to the state such that it would be fair to assert jurisdiction.8 6 With one possible exception,8 7 the instant case discounted all contacts
was prior to InternationalShoe, which dealt specifically with suits against publishers who had
distributed their publications through the mail. The issue in those cases was whether mailing
of periodicals into a state created a valid contact, whereas in the instant case the concern was
whether advertising in national publications constituted a valid contact. See Insull v. New
York World-Telegram Corp., 273 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1959); Street & Smith Publications, Inc. v.
Spike, 120 F.2d 895 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 314 U.S. 653 (1941). In the instant case, to deny
advertising as a legitimate contact is to deny the method by which plaintiff initially gained
knowledge of the defendant's product. 583 F.2d at 186.
79. The court made no investigation into the general scope of the defendant's business
in Louisiana as in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Golino, 383 F.2d 586, 591 (5th Cir. 1967) (holding
that the percentage of sales of a national magazine in Louisana which roughly comported with
that state's percentage of national population was sufficient to render magazine publishers
amenable to service of process under the Louisiana long-arm statute).
80. 583 F.2d at 186. The court characterized the shipping cost as having been "added to
the cost of the boat"; however, because the plaintiff paid a total price of $30,000, which included all shipping charges and accessories, the shipping cost should have been characterized
as included in the price. See Brief for Appellant at 8, Charia v. Cigarette Racing Team, Inc.,
583 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1978).
81. 583 F.2d at 188-89. The court acknowledged that all four sales in Louisiana were
shipped F.O.B. Miami but attributed no special significance to that information. Id. at 189.
No investigation was undertaken to determine whether the buyer participated in a bargaining
process regarding method of shipment or whether method of shipment was simply an adhesive
requirement of the sales agreement.
82. The court's acquiescence to the commercial rules regarding F.O.B. shipment belies
the realities of the transaction. The corporate seller arranged for the boat's shipment and
gave directions for its delivery to Louisiana. Id. at 186. The court's decision gave corporate
enterprises a tool for evading in personam jurisdiction by asserting a legal fiction that the sale
to a consumer took place at the point of shipment.
83. 357 U.S. at 253.
84. Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483, 496-97 (5th Cir. 1974). In Cousteau
the court found that the requirement of purposeful activity within the forum was satisfied
when the defendant knowingly transacted business with a resident of the forum and enjoyed
the financial benefits of transactions in the state. Id. at 496. For an article adopting a similar
construction of Hanson, see Comment, supra note 24, at 308.
85. 583 F.2d at 189.
86. See text accompanying note 84 supra.
87. 583 F.2d at 189. The court alluded to the possibility that a defendant who had shipped
large quantities of his product into the state over an extended period of time would be
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which fell short of physical presence within the forum.8 8 In view of the defendant's sales and other associations with the forum in the instant case, application of the Cousteau interpretation of Hanson undoubtedly would have led
9
to a ruling that sufficient contacts existed to sustain jurisdiction.
In the instant case, the Fifth Circuit reached a questionable result based on
an arguably misplaced reliance on Benjamin. If determined to have prece-

dential value, this decision will mark a return to the court's conservative and
outmoded view that quantitative indicia of presence are necessary for in
personamjurisdiction. 0 A practitioner faced with the continuum of conflicting
interpretations within the Fifth Circuit cannot predict with confidence the outcome of a jurisdictional dispute. As a result, plaintiffs prosecuting foreign defendants whose contacts with the local forum fall short of actual presence may
be unnecessarily forced to opt for the inconvenience and expense of a foreign
forum. Unless the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit en
1
develops some consistent and discernible standard for gauging in
ban&'
personam jurisdiction, this area of the law will remain susceptible to differing
interpretations.
DENIS NoAH
amenable to jurisdiction. See Coulter v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 426 F.2d 1315, 1318 (5th Cir.

1970).
88. 583 F.2d at 189. The court emphasized the defendant's lack of physical presence in
Louisiana while minimizing the importance of other contacts with the forum, thus prescribing
physical presence as a prerequisite to sustain in personam jurisdiction.
89. The instant case would seemingly provide a stronger argument for jurisdiction than
Cousteau, considering that contacts and revenues were greater. Additionally, under the Hanson
standard, the plaintiff's actions in Cousteau were arguably more unilateral in nature because
the defendant had in no way prompted the relationship by advertising. See text accompanying
notes 27-29 supra. Furthermore, Cousteau presented a case of an arm's-length transaction between two commercial entities, while the instant case involved a corporate seller dealing with
a consumer; in this situation, the courts have generally been inclined to favor the disadvantaged consumer class. See note 75 supra and accompanying text.
90. See text accompanying notes 31-32 supra.
91. Failure to acknowledge that the Fifth Circuit is comprised of three-judge panels which
independently adjudicate cases is to ignore the realities of the institution. In recent years the
different branches of the circuit have developed different policies regarding in personam
jurisdiction. The weitern divisions of the circuit have opted for more liberal jurisdictional
standards. See, e.g., Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1974) (adopting the McGee substantial connection test); Coulter v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 426 F.2d 1315 (5th
Cir. 1970) (adopting stream of commerce theory). On the other hand, the eastern divisions of
the court have maintained a very conservative stance with respect to in personam jurisdiction.
See, e.g., Benjamin v. Western Boat Bldg. Corp., 472 F.2d 723 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
830 (1978) (applying a quantitative and mechanical jurisdictional test). Formulation of a
circuit-wide standard for jurisdictional analysis set forth by an en banc opinion could go far
toward ensuring consistency in Fifth Circuit decisions.
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